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In view of the many papers and books that have been written
analyzing the methodology of the income maintenance experiments as
well as other social experiments, it is indeed difficult to say anything
entirely new. However, we shall emphasize what we consider to be im-
portant, basic points in the planning, execution and evaluation of social
experiments that may prove useful in future experiments. The plan of
the paper is as follows. In the next section, we put forward considera-
tions relevant for evaluating social experiments. We then take up design
issues within the context of static designs, while the following section is
devoted to issues that arise in dynamic contexts, the usual setting for
most social experiments. Suggestions for linking social experiments to
already existing longitudinal data bases are presented and discussed. In
both static and dynamic contexts, we discuss the roles of models,
whether statistical or structural, and of randomization. Design for
prediction of relevant experimental outcomes is emphasized and illus-
trated in terms of simplified versions of the negative income tax experi-
ments. Finally, we present a summary and some concluding remarks.
Considerations Relevant for Evaluating the Methodology
of Social Experiments
Since social experiments usually involve the expenditure of millions
of dollars, resources that have alternative research uses and potentially
great social value, it is critical that the experiments be conducted in a
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manner that is methodologically sound. The task of defining good or op-
timal methodology is difficult, however, because social experiments are
multidimensional in nature, involving many disciplines and activities.
Also, good experimentation involves creativity and innovation, which
are difficult to define. We will discuss critical features that can be of vital
importance for the success of social experiments.
A clear-cut statement of the objectives of an experiment is the first
requirement of a good methodological approach. Poorly formulated ob-
jectives are an indication of poor methodology in general. If an experi-
ment is purely for research, then the researchers have the responsibility
for formulating its objectives. On the other hand, if the experiment has
mainly policy objectives, then it is critical that researchers and relevant
policymakers jointly formulate the objectives of the experiment.1
Once the objectives of an experiment have been clearly formulated,
the second step involves a feasibility study, in order to determine how
and if the objectives can be realized. This should include a review of
previous studies and data, experimental and nonexperimental, relating
to the objectives of the current experiment. It should also consider in
detail the needed inputs for the proposed experiment. Usually subject
matter specialists, well versed in the subject to be investigated,2 survey
experts, and design statisticians will be required. Most important is the
development of an operational approach that is capable of realizing the
objectives of the experiment.
If the objectives involve the production of results in a short time, the
feasibility study may indicate that calculations using nonexperimental
data are all that can be done. On the other hand, if a social experiment
seems feasible, its design and costs should be explicitly developed.
Finally, the quality of both the research team and the managerial or ad-
ministrative personnel is of key importance.
In the feasibility study, it is desirable that calculations be performed
to provide preliminary estimates of important effects.3 These rough
calculations provide important order-of-magnitude estimates that can be
quite useful as background information in evaluating experimental
designs. Last, it is usually good practice to execute a "pilot" or "test"
trial of the experiment, just as survey questionnaires are subject to pre-
tests. Such pilot experiments can reveal many unexpected results and
aid in the redesign of the "final" experiment.
The quality of measurements is a third key issue in the evaluation of
the methodology of social experiments.4 If measurements are of low
quality, the results of an experiment are of dubious value. Are all ap-
propriate and relevant variables being measured? Are the
measurements afflicted by response and recall biases? Do subjects
misrepresent data for various reasons? Are Hawthorne effects present?
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be pursued vigorously in a good methodological approach to social ex-
perimentation. This requires that data specialists and those familiar with
measurement methodology be involved in the execution of a social
experiment.
Fourth, as stated above, outstanding subject matter specialists are
required, in order to ensure that the methodology of an experiment is
appropriate.5 An experiment usually involves subjecting experimental
units to important changed conditions. Since their responses to the
changed conditions are usually adaptive and dynamic in nature, care
must be taken in choosing a model that can represent such responses
and serve as a basis for choice of an experimental design. Designs can be
chosen not only to estimate effects from given models but also to pro-
vide data that are useful for testing uncertain features of a model
brought to light by experts’ analyses of existing theory and models. For
example, such considerations may involve use of a model with several
equations rather than a single equation for, say, labor supply. If the
multiple equation model is appropriate, a design based on a single equa-
tion is inappropriate and can lead to erroneous conclusions.6
Fifth, the design of the experiments and other statistical issues are
basic to a good methodological approach. If the objectives of an experi-
ment involve generalization of the results to an entire population, then
the sample of experimental units has to be a sample from the relevant
population.7 The relevant population must be carefully defined with
respect to spatial, temporals and other characteristics. Further complica-
tions arise from the inability of experimenters to require participation in
an experiment. Those volunteering to participate may possibly be dif-
ferent from those not willing to participate and if so, the experiment may
be subject to selection biases. (See Duan et al. (1984) for an evaluation of
models that attempt to correct for selection bias.) Further, there is the
problem of attrition.9 It is important to do everything possible to keep
the attrition rate low. Sampling the dropouts and using the results of
analyses relating to these samples is one way of checking on the impor-
tance of attrition bias and of correcting for it. Constant vigilance with
respect to possible sources of bias and the use of every means possible to
avoid such biases are characteristic of a good methodological approach.
Assigning units to treatment and control groups at random is con-
sidered good practice by most experimenters. However, good ran-
domization procedures depend on an intimate knowledge of the model
generating the observations, as Jeffreys (1967, p. 239ff.) and Conlisk
(1985) have demonstrated. For example, Conlisk (1985) has shown that
effective randomization when treatment effects are additive is not effec-
tive when treatment effects enter a model nonlinearly. Thus, how one
randomizes depends on what one knows about features of a model for
the observations--for example, see Rubin (1974). Also, a randomized134 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
design for a static model may not be effective if the static model
misrepresents dynamic responses to "treatments" and other variables.
Last, it is worthwhile to emphasize not only precision in design but also
balance and robustness of design, as Morris (1979) has emphasized.
Sixth, a successful social experiment requires good managers and
administrative methods. A good research manager will be invaluable in
scheduling operations of a large-scale social experiment, keeping control
of costs, instituting good data management procedures, and, most
importantly, guiding the project so as to raise the probability of its
success in meeting its objectives. Good management involves not only
selection of appropriate researchers and other personnel but also
surveillance of the project to ensure that researchers are pursuing the
stated objectives of the experiment. There usually is a great danger that
researchers may get involved in tangential problems and issues and
possibly provide the right answer to the wrong problem, a statistical
error of the third kind.l°
As the experience with the negative income tax experiments has in-
dicated, data collection and data processing costs have been a large frac-
tion of total costs of social experiments.11 Thus, it is important to put a
great deal of emphasis on the design of efficient computerized data
management systems and on ways to record basic data directly into
computerized data bases.
Seventh, good experimental research methodology involves concen-
tration on the prediction of observable outcomes of an experiment and
on establishing reproducible results. Predicting the observable outcomes
of a social experiment, for example the costs of variants of a negative in-
come tax program, might be the main objective of a social experiment. If
so, the experiment should be designed to provide, accurate enough
predictions of the costs of these variants along with measures of predic-
tive precision. Calculations yielding these predictions should be
reproducible. However, the final proof will be the extent to which the
experiment’s predictions agree with the actual cost of a negative income
tax program, if instituted. That is, good experimental methodology
results in predictions that are verified in practice.
Finally, the results of an experiment must be well reported. Careless
reporting of experimental results can lead to the adoption of incorrect
policies, particularly when the experiment’s objectives are not one-to-
one with policymakers’ objectives.12 Good methodology requires great
care in reporting the results of experiments with attention paid to their
uncertainties and measures of precision. Results must be reported in a
probabilistic framework that policymakers can understand.
The schematic diagram may be useful in providing an overall appre-
ciation of the process of social experimentation, although it should be
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cluded. For example, at various stages in the execution of an experiment
research findings may indicate a need for changes in objectives, the
model chosen for the observations, or other aspects of the experiment.
While some of these eventualities may be taken into account in sequen-
tial designs, taking appropriate measures to deal with the unforeseen is
an important element of a good methodological approach. (Watts and
Bawden (1978) provide an account of some surprises that actually oc-
curred in the experiments.)
Elements Involved in Planning and Executing Social Experiments
Statement of Objectives
[ Feasibility Study
Choice of Approach~ and Management Plan
Choice of Model for Observationsb
[ Statistical Design of Experiment
Management Plan for Field Execution
I Data Collection and Data Quality
[ Analysis of Data and Prediction of Outcomes
[ Reporting of Results
aIt is assumed that a social experiment approach is feasible and selected.
blt is assumed that a relevant population has been defined.
CThe statistical design can involve checks on the adequacy of alternative models for the
observations and reflect what is learned from "pilot" or "test" trials of the experiment.136 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
Design and Analysis in a Static Framework
A substantial literature has developed on the econometric problems
associated with the design of social experiments and the analysis of
experimental data. We shall not attempt an exhaustive summary or cri-
tique of the econometric literature on social experiments.13 Rather, in
this section, we shall discuss some key features of design of social exper-
iments in the context of a simple "static" setting. The social experiment
will take place during one experimental "period," which is assumed to
be long enough for households to respond fully to the experimental
treatment. The simple static setting will allow us to stress statistical
problems common to most social experiments without detailed exposi-
tion of complicated structural models. Of course, use of a static model
abstracts from some important dynamic considerations in both the
design and analysis of experiments, which we will take up in a later
section.
Review and Critique of Existing Design Procedures
The design of social experiments involves three distinct sorts of deci-
sions: 1) the choice of experimental population, 2) the choice of the
design space or range of possible treatments, and 3) the allocation of
subjects (typically, households) to various treatment and control
groups. In all major social experiments, specific sites (most often
SMSAs) have been chosen for an experiment. On each site, the eligible
population is determined and a sample from this population is invited to
participate in the experiment. High administrative and field interview
costs are cited as reasons for using a site-based approach.14 The goal of a
representative site (Middletown, USA) has proved elusive. As a result,
the experimental population is frequently not representative of the
target population for a national program. In order to extrapolate the
findings of the experiment to a national scale, some sort of structural
model must be assumed.15
National probability samples should be considered for future exper-
iments. The problems with administration and field operations of a
national experiment appear to have been exaggerated by the planners of
the negative income tax experiments. A number of national survey
organizations have routinely conducted national surveys since the
1960s. (The National Opinion Research Center at the University of
Chicago and the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan are examples.) Differences in local welfare laws make it all the
more necessary to diversify the sample to include more than a handful
of sites.16 In the next section, we propose the formation of an ongoing
panel based on a national sample flame for use in social experiments. ItEVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY 137
should be noted that marketing researchers have used both the national
sample approach (Nielsen surveys) and the site-based approach (most
often used in the test-marketing of products) to evaluate the effects of
changes in advertising and the response of consumers to new products.
Once a target population is selected, the designers of the experiment
must select the range of possible treatments. In the negative income tax
experiments, the possible combinations of tax rates and support levels
determine the design space. The possible range of treatment variables
appears to have been selected in an ad hoc fashion through a combina-
tion of political compromise and personal judgment. Describing the
New Jersey experiment, Conlisk and Watts write:
The problem, then, was one of specifying a sample in the three
dimensional design space of (g,t,w) triplets [support, tax rate, and
wage rate]. Sampling was restricted to a region within the design
space which provided substantial variation .... but kept to (g,t,w)
combinations of actual policy interest . . . So the design problem
reduced to finding optimal numbers of families.., to allocate to each
design point.17
Keeley and Robins (1980b, p. 328) point out in their excellent critique of
the design of the Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiments that
it is not clear how to "specify the design space" and, more importantly,
that "efficiency may be increased by changing the design space for a
given response function." The problem of choice of design space is not
unique to either the Conlisk/Watts response surface approach (used in
all negative income tax experiments) or the ANOVA model approach
(used in the design of the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment) to
experimental design. Neither approach gives adequate guidance in the
choice of the range of treatments.
The designs used in the negative income tax experiments tended to
be overly conservative with less variation in treatment than is desirable,
particularly when the goal of the experiment is to estimate quantities
that are imprecisely known to start with. For example, in the Seattle-
Denver experiment, marginal tax rates of between 0.5 and 0.8 were
used. The range of these rates is very limited and does not include either
the high or the low tax rates that might be expected to produce the most
or least labor supply reduction. It is precisely from such extreme experi-
mental conditions that most can be learned about model parameters and
model adequacy. In the Seattle-Denver experiments, a tax rate of 0.3 and
a support level of $3800 would have had a grant break-even level of
$12,667, only slightly higher than the highest break-even level in the
study ($12,000).
The distribution of treatment points over the feasible set of treat-
ments is critical for ensuring appropriate precision in the estimation of138 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
treatment effects and for testing the model specification. Without an
adequate range of treatment levels, precise treatment effect estimates
can only be obtained from huge samples, beyond the means of social
experimenters. Perhaps most importantly, without a fairly uniform
distribution of treatments across the design space it is difficult to test for
model misspecification by comparing alternative models. We find little
attention directed toward this important problem in the social experi-
mentation literature.
Allocation of participating families across treatment groups has
received considerable attention. With few exceptions, economists have
rejected a classical analysis of variance approach in favor of a model-
based approach developed by Conlisk and Watts. (See Conlisk and
Watts (1979) for a full description of this technique.) A response surface-
based allocation of households to treatment groups was used, usually
with modifications, in all the negative income tax experiments, the
health insurance experiment, and several time-of-day electricity pricing
experiments. The heart of the response-surface approach to design is a
demand equation: in the case of the negative income tax experiment, a
demand for leisure equation is used. Given a specification of the
demand equation, optimal allocations of households across treatment
groups are derived. The goal of the experimental design procedure is
assumed to be the maximization of the precision of estimation of the
coefficients of the response model, subject to a budget constraint. Op-
timal allocations from the demand equation model provide non-
orthogonal experimental designs, which should provide greater preci-
sion in estimation of key model parameters than traditional orthogonal
designs as well as samples with lower experimental cost.
A critical assumption in the application of the response surface
models is that experimental observations may be more costly than con-
trol observations both in terms of benefits and administrative costs. In
their excellent critique of the Conlisk/Watts model, Keeley et al. (1980,
p. 328) indicate that in the Seattle-Denver experiments experimental
observations were assumed to be four times as expensive as controls,
when the actual cost ratio was 2.3. Because of the asymmetry of observa-
tion costs, the response surface approach yields non-orthogonal and
non-randomized experimental designs. Keeley and Robins (1980a, b)
and Hausman and Wise (1985) have emphasized the severe problems
produced by the endogenous stratification induced by this cost function.
It is difficult to understand this preoccupation with cost-effective
designs when most of the significant costs of negative income tax experi-
ments are fixed or at least constant across households. Typically, the
data processing, field operations and analysis budgets for negative in-
come tax experiments far exceeded the total benefits paid out. (See, for
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Perhaps the most serious defect of the response model approach is
the extreme sensitivity of the optimal designs to model misspecification.
As Conlisk (1973) and Aigner (1979a) have reported, optimal designs for
one response function can be very suboptimal for other response func-
tions. Given the considerable uncertainty about the appropriate
specification of labor supply behavior, a good design procedure should
incorporate some robustness to departures from model assumptions.
Model misspecification can include incorrect functional form for the de-
mand equation, measurement errors in the independent variables, omit-
ted or latent variables, incorrect distributional assumptions (outliers,
sample truncation and censoring), sample selection bias, and incorrect
dynamic specifications. Due to the inherent difficulties in measuring in-
come and wage rates and the field operations mistakes made in the
negative income tax experiments, the problems of accounting for
measurement error biases are particularly important. Measurement
error problems are further compounded when the design is stratified
based on an endogenous variable that is measured with error. Explicit
consideration of measurement errors is a necessary condition for op-
timal design in these situations.
A natural way to produce robust statistical designs is to use ran-
domization procedures, by which households are randomly assigned to
treatment groups according to simple or stratified random sampling
procedures. Randomization procedures have been widely used in ex-
perimental design in medical, psychological and educational research
for many decades. Based on both practical experience and extensive
theoretical research (Fisher, 1925 and Kempthorne, 1952) randomization
procedures have been shown to have great value in reducing bias in the
determination of experimental effects when response models are
misspecified. As Hausman and Wise (1985) and Morris (1979) have
pointed out, to the extent that unobserved variables are correlated with
observed variables over which the design is randomized, the effects of
model misspecification are mitigated,is
The severe problems that have plagued the response model ap-
proach to design have prompted some economists to advocate designs
based on the simplest sort of analysis of variance (ANOVA) model. (See,
for example, Hausman and Wise, 1985.) Optimal design in an ANOVA
framework requires an orthogonal layout of treatments and a random
assignment of participants to the various treatment groups (each group
corresponds to a row of the X matrix in the Conlisk/Watts model). Of
course, the ANOVA model is a special case of the general linear
response model used by Conlisk and Watts. It appears that the chief
benefits of the ANOVA approach are simplicity of analysis and ran-
domization over participant characteristics, which avoids the problem of
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to model misspecification, as pointed out by Conlisk (1985), requires
many observations when there are large numbers of cells, and, most im-
portantly, cannot be used to generalize in important ways from the
experimental experience. That is, ANOVA models are designed to test
for experimental effects and cannot be easily adapted for predictive pur-
poses. Also, given the problems of a site-based sample and participation
and attrition biases, it is highly unlikely that experimental data will be
representative of the national target population for a social program.
Thus, a response model would have to be built to extrapolate the
ANOVA experimental findings to a national scale.
An essential problem with both response function and ANOVA ap-
proaches to experimental design is that research objectives of a study are
not explicitly included in the objective function used to determine the
optimal design. If the objective of a negative income tax experiment is to
estimate accurately the cost of a national program, the objective function
should be formulated to measure the precision of cost estimates.
Similarly, if the goal is to refine estimates of substitution effects, the
precision of these estimates should define the objective function.19 The
usefulness of the current experimental design techniques can be gauged
by noting that we know of no social experiment in which the original
design model was used in the analysis of experimental data. In all of the
negative income tax experiments the original response model was
discarded in favor of more restrictive labor supply functions, which have
drastically fewer parameters.
The unusual role of controls in social experiments also involves dif-
ficulties with current design techniques. A control subject is defined in
the classical experimentation literature as a subject who received no
treatment. In the negative income tax experiments, many control
families received current AFDC benefits (of course, the investigators
could not ask these households to give up income support altogether)
while other families received no welfare benefits of any kind. These con-
trol AFDC families are receiving a different treatment, not the null treat-
ment. In fact, the control households are treated in most analyses simply
as additional experimental households with different tax rates and
disposable income. Control households are lumped into the sample to
"increase estimation efficiency.’’2° Investigators often perform some
sort of pooling test to see if controls and experimentals can be lumped
together. The question of whether controls are necessary in any funda-
mental sense except as low-cost observations has not been adequately
addressed. One could also ask whether experimental observations are
necessary and whether the existing experimental variations in prices
and income are sufficient to estimate household response functions
precisely.
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objective function of the experiment as well as determine if the experi-
ment is necessary. In the next section, we outline a decision-theoretic
approach that provides a workable solution to this problem.
A Decision-Theoretic Approach
The key to developing a useful experimental design is a well-defined
and meaningful objective function. Clearly defined objectives are critical
in planning for a useful experiment. By forcing both the contracting
agency and the investigator to specify clear and quantifiable objectives,
it is possible to determine accurately whether an experiment is necessary
and to produce a design that is able to discern treatment effects. Two
main objectives were pursued in the negative income tax experiments:
1) computation of the net program cost of a national negative income tax
program21 and 2) estimation of the national labor supply response (work
disincentive) to proposed negative income tax programs. The estimation
of the labor supply response is a less ambitious goal than the costing of a
national program and comes closest to the goal of most of the principal
investigators.
It is also crucial that the results of a study be formulated in a way
that can be effectively communicated to policymakers. We have found
the research memoranda and papers on the negative income tax ex-
periments to be very difficult to decipher even for readers with con-
siderable econometric expertise. The results of statistical analyses are
often reported without standard errors or evidence of diagnostic check-
ing of any kind, without the number of observations in the estimation
sample, and with poor labeling of tables and diagrams. More important-
ly, however, the extreme emphasis on point estimation and significance
tests results often leads to misleading reports. For the policymaker in-
terested in the costs of a national negative income tax, it is not sufficient
to supply a point estimate of total costs. Some measure of the uncertain-
ty in that point estimate due to estimation and possible specification
error must also be supplied. It is extremely difficult to convey the uncer-
tainty in point estimates just by supplying the estimate and the standard
error of estimate. It is more useful to supply an interval and some proba-
bility statement about that interval. For a policymaker evaluating a
negative income tax program, a statement such as "Given the informa-
tion obtained in this experiment, we can say with a probability of .9 that
the net program cost falls between A and B," is useful and understand-
able. Such a statement is one aspect of the predictive density of program
costs, given the information available at the time of the report. The
predictive probability density function expresses information about
future costs on the basis of past sample and prior information with a due
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The policymaker can be supplied with various summary measures
of the predictive density of costs, including the probabilities associated
with various prediction intervals and measures of dispersion (variance,
standard deviation and interquartile range) as well as plots of the densi-
ty. In this way the policymaker can be assured that the accuracy of infor-
mation available on key response parameters has been taken into
account. Uncertainty with respect to the form of the response model can
also be quantified, a problem treated at the end of this section.
The failure to report estimates of the precision of national cost
estimates in the existing literature is all the more disturbing given that
the national labor supply response may be very imprecisely estimated.
To illustrate this point, let us examine the Keeley et al. (1978b) estimates
of total labor supply response to various negative income tax programs.
Keeley et al. estimate the hours response of heads of households and
wives by applying a fitted labor response equation to a national proba-
bility sample of households derived from the Current Population
Survey. By adding up the estimated hours supplied for each record in
the file, Keeley et al. are able to produce national estimates of the work
incentive/disincentive effect of various negative income tax programs.
The labor supply response is figured in with other welfare and tax
effects to impute the net cost of negative income tax programs. Their
analysis depends critically on the quality of their estimated labor supply
response functions.22 Careful examination of their fitted response func-
tions reveals that the fits are very poor and the coefficients measuring
income and substitution effects are imprecisely estimated.23 For exam-
ple, in the equation for husbands, the standard error of regression is 720
hours per year. The mean number of hours worked per year before the
negative income tax program is 1,999 for husbands. This suggests ~hat
the error variance in the labor supply response relationship is very large.
(It also suggests that the model may be misspecified.) Even without
taking account of estimation error, we would expect that predictions of
supply responses to a national program would be very imprecise. In ad-
dition, the coefficients of the key variables are very imprecisely esti-
mated. In the equation for husbands, not a single coefficient is estimated
to within one significant digit of precision!
The results of microsimulation presented in table 7 of the Keeley et
al. (1978b) paper do not include measures of precision. This gives the
reader a false sense of the accuracy of these results. To illustrate the
potentially enormous standard errors of prediction for these numbers,
we will undertake some approximate standard error calculations. To
obtain these crude figures, we must make many simplifying assump-
tions because we do not have access to the experimental and national
data. However, the assumptions that are made bias downward our
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average reduction of 19 hours per year for husbands in a negative income
tax program with support equal to 75 percent of the poverty level and a
50 percent tax rate. To put this figure in a form useful for computing pro-
gram costs, we express all estimates as national totals. An average
reduction of 19 hours implies a total reduction of 756 million hours per
year for the total labor force of husbands. Keeley et al. have computed
the total hours figure by summing up individual estimates as follows.
fltot~ ~ I~
(1)
To derive the variance of the prediction error, Htot - Piton, we must make
some assumptions about the prediction errors for each individual’s
equation. We assume that the parameters of the response function are
known and concentrate on the source of variability from the inherent
randomness in the labor supply relationship, that is its error term. The
calculation of the prediction error variance depends critically on the
assumption used for the joint distribution of the labor supply of
husbands. If it is assumed that the error terms of each husband are in-
dependent, the results are radically different from those obtained in the
case in which even a small amount of dependence is allowed between
units. To simplify the calculations, we assume that the N x N error
covariance matrix has a simple patterned structure,
1 p p
p 1 p p
p
1 p
P P P 1
= oZ[(1-p)IN + P t t’],
where ~ is an N x I vector with unit elements. Under these simplifying
assumptions, the variance of the aggregate prediction error is given by,
Var (Ht°t- t21t°t) = f2 Var (Hi- I21i) + ~ c°v (Hi- I2Ii’ HI- I2Ii)
=Noz + N(N-1) po2 = No2 (1 - p + NO).
The standard error, o = 720 of the estimated tobit equation in table 3 of
the Keeley et al. paper and an assumption about the value of # can be
combined to produce a prediction error variance estimate. With # = 0,
N = 39.8 million, and o = 720, the prediction standard error is 4.54144 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
million hours, which would produce a tight prediction interval around
the point estimate of -756 million hours. If we allow for even a small
amount of dependence by assuming p = .01, the prediction standard
error increases to 2.86 billion hours. It should be emphasized that we are
neglecting estimation error in these calculations by assuming that the
conditional mean function is known to the ana, lyst. The sensitivity of
these calculations to what is assumed about the value of p is striking.
The fundamental goals of social experiments have been predictive.
Either Bayesian or classical prediction techniques can be used to produce
predictions and measures of precision. These same techniques can be
used to determine the optimal design of experiments. Before the experi-
ment is undertaken, some prior information is available on the key
response parameters. In the case of labor supply, a number of studies
with nonexperimental data24 have produced both substitution and
income elasticity estimates. These estimates can be combined to form a
prior distribution for the response parameter vector, p(0). The predictive
density of hours can be computed using this prior2s and compared to
the predictive density which would be obtained after the experiment.
The before and after predictive densities can be compared to determine
if a given experiment has sufficient information value to warrant under-
taking it. Peck and Richels (1986) use a similar decision-theoretic
approach to indicate how to decide upon future research on the acid rain
problem. Stafford (1985) also proposed a decision-theoretic approach for
determining if negative income tax experiments~are useful. Stafford pro-
posed a social utility function and suggested that the information value
of social experiments be measured via social utility. We avoid the
problems associated with postulating a social welfare function and focus
on the narrower goal of evaluating predictive accuracy.
Comparison of predictive densities can be accomplished by com-
puting various scalar measures of differences in the distributions. Inter-
val and probability estimates may be the most useful computations. For
example, it may be that a 90 percent probability interval for the national
costs of a riegative income tax might include a wide range of values in-
cluding cost greatly above and below current welfare costs. It may be the
case that a given experimental design may sharpen up this interval to
the point that policymakers may feel comfortable with the point cost
estimate. One suspects that these types of calculations, when applied to
the designs used in previous negative income tax studies, would sug-
gest that the experiments had little informational value. Other summary
measures that may be considered are variances and other moments and
the divergence of two densities.
We have emphasized in earlier sections that uncertainty about
model specification is one of the most serious problems confronting the
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functional form of the labor supply function can easily be challenged.
Problems with sample selection bias from the participation decision,
attrition, and missing values also plague social experiments.26 For
example, Ferber and Hirsch (1979) point out that only 345 data points
out of the more than 1300 enrolled households in the New Jersey experi-
ment were actually used in estimating labor supply response. In the
Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiments, approximately 1600
out of the total 2600 husband-wife households were used in fitting the
labor supply equation. Useful optimal design procedures must consider
the problem of optimal model selection and discrimination between
alternative parametric models -- see Box and Hill (1967), Covey - Crump
and Silvey (1970), Guttman (1971) and O’Hagan (1978).
Given the considerable uncertainty regarding model specification,
we are puzzled about the lack of discussion of predictive validation of
models in the research reports of social experiments. The experimental
data often contain numerous subsamples corresponding to different
sites or different time periods or different treatment groups which could
be used for validation purposes. For example, labor supply response
functions fitted to Denver data could have been used to predict
responses for the Seattle sample. If the labor supply function is well
specified, the error terms should only contain random shifts due to
tastes and other omitted characteristics of the households, and the
prediction errors should follow the assumed error distribution in the
model specification. If the response function cannot reliably extrapolate
the results from one site to another, it is unreasonable to expect the same
specification to be useful in predicting response to a national program.
A useful and easily generalized approach to model selection in-
volves calculation of posterior probabilities of models in a Bayesian
framework. Consider two different probability models for labor supply
response, H, pl(HI0~) and p2(HlO2) where 01and 02 are parameter vec-
tors. For a given data set, we can compute the posterior probability of
each model as follows:27
Pr(model il data) = J" 1~ (0~1 data)p~(0~)Pr(model i)dO~/G (2)
where G = Pr(model lldata) + Pr(model 21data). The key ingredients in
(2) are the likelihood function for each model, l(.), the prior density for
model parameters, Pi(.), and the prior probability of the model. For com-
parison of models, we note that this approach does not require that the
models be nested or that the models exhaust the set of plausible models.
We do not adopt an accept&eject philosophy which eliminates models
from future consideration even if the information in the data is insuffi-
cient to distinguish between the models. For many problems of practical
interest, posterior model probabilities can be calculated without resort to
asymptotic approximations.146 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
One of the principal econometric problems encountered in the
modeling of labor supply stems from the mass point at zero hours sup-
plied in the empirical hours distribution. The analysts in the Seattle-
Denver experiment used the truncated normal regression or tobit model
to account for the massing of hours at zero:
TOBIT model: Hi = ~Xi ~ + ~i ~i -- iid N(0,o2)
Hi = max (Hi,0).
The tobit model can be considered as a special case of a two-equation
model in which the first equation predicts labor force participation and
the second equation gives labor supply response conditional on labor
force participation.28 A simple "two-part" model can be constructed by
writing the density of H as consisting of a discrete and continuous
part.29
p(H) = PR(H > O)p(HIH > 0).
The participation equation can be a simple logit or probit binomial
response model and the conditional distribution of hours for those in the
labor force can be modeled with a simple regression function as follows:
Pr(Hi > 0) = F(~x~) (4)
H~ = Z0~ +~e for H~ > 0. (5)
The distributional assumptions and parameter restrictions behind the
tobit model are difficult to verify directly with data. One possible ap-
proach would be to fit the bivariate normal sample selection model of
Heckman (1979) which nests the tobit specification. A significance test
could then be performed on the parameter restrictions. However, the
nested model hypothesis-testing approach often results in rejection of
restricted models in favor of an unrestricted "super" model. Unfor-
tunately, there is no clear connection between the tests of restrictions
and the predictive performance of the models. It may well be that a tobit
restrictions test may yield a rejection even though predictions from the
tobit model may not differ much from a more complicated model. In
fact, due to estimation error the simpler models may have a smaller out-
of-sample mean squared error of prediction. Thus, predictive com-
parisons of alternative models should form the basis of model selection.
The normality assumption at the heart of the tobit and Heckman
models is more difficult to check. The "two-part" model in equations (4)
and (5) is more flexible and does not require strict normality assump-
tions. It would be of great interest to compare the tobit and two-part
specifications. Equation (2) can be used to compute posterior model
probabilities in much the same spirit as Rossi (1985). The integrationEVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY 147
over the model parameters necessary to compute the posterior probabil-
ities can be performed with Monte Carlo numerical integration tech-
niques as in Rossi (1985), or asymptotic normal expansions of the
posterior distribution of the parameter vector can be used.3° It should be
noted that the posterior model probabilities can be used to average
predictions from alternative models--see, for example, Geisel (1975, p.
229). We can hedge our bets on model specification by carrying along a
small set of competing models until (if ever) one model specification
dominates.
By stressing the predictive objectives of social experiments, it is
possible to solve both optimal design and estimation problems in a man-
ner consistent with a study’s objectives. As a general rule, past analyses
of social experiments have not stressed predictive validation or useful
reporting of national cost and response estimates. We hope our sugges-
tions will motivate a rethinking of the statistical methodology for use
with experimental data.
Design and Analysis in a Dynamic Framework
Dynamic aspects of economic behavior have received increasing at-
tention in both theoretical and empirical literature. Labor economists
were among the first to stress the importance of dynamic economic
models. Recent empirical labor economics often uses time series or panel
data to explore dynamic econometric models. Much of this effort to
understand economic dynamics was exerted during the time of the
major social experiments. As Griliches31 has pointed out, "theory...
could be changing exogenously, thereby making the experiment less in-
teresting than originally." Future experiments designed to gauge the
response to social programs will have to be designed to illuminate some
of the dynamic aspects of economic behavior.
In labor economics, dynamic models of labor supply have been
developed to explain the life cycle pattern of labor/leisure allocations as
well as the patterns in the spells of employment and unemployment. As
many have pointed out, the labor supply schedule derived from a life
cycle model of labor supply can differ substantially from the model
based on a one-period demand-for-leisure analysis. Changes in income
support programs can also affect the search for new jobs and the dura-
tions of periods of employment and unemployment. Much of the labor
force is under implicit or explicit contracts which would be affected by
changes in transfer programs. The stochastic process governing labor
force participation is much more complicated than the simple Bernouli
trial models behind common statistical specifications. The assumption
that workers form rational expectations suggests that macro-level148 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
variables, which are useful in predicting the future course of output and
wages, should be included in micro labor supply functions.
On a practical level, one of the most important dynamic aspects of
social experimen!s is the problem of experiment duration. Most social
experiments’ test programs are intended to be implemented on a
"permanent" basis or certainly for a much greater duration than the ex-
periment. It seems obvious that households will react differently to per-
manent rather than transitory changes in wages and income. Moreover,
experiments may be influenced by business cycle effects. The negative
income tax experiments are of a short duration, typically lasting fewer
than five years.32 As an extreme case, the Housing Allowance Demand
Experiment featured treatment cells in which households more often
than not had to find new housing meeting rather arbitrary quality stan-
dards in order to qualify for small rent subsidies over only a two-year
period. Other social experiments, notably some of the medical treatment
experiments, have been conducted over much longer periods. In ex-
perimental situations in which treatment is limited to short durations,
the challenge for the analyst is to calculate unobserved long-term effects.
As in our discussion of static models, we shall focus on the labor
supply response relationship in the discussion of dynamic models. In
the simple static model only current wages and income enter into the
response function. Obviously, dynamic models enlarge this specifica-
tion to include lagged response and input variables.33 However, given
the considerable debate over the appropriate dynamic theory of
behavior, it may be wise to design in the context of an unrestricted
transfer function model:
Hi = v, (B)wt + v2 (B)yt + at
where wt is the wage rate, Yt the income series, at follows a linear time
series model, B is the backshift operator and vl(B) and v2(B) are rational
functions of B. Of course, our ability to estimate lag structures can be
~everely limited by a short duration of an experimer~t. In such a situa-
tion, it is not clear that use of a static model will yield reliable results.
Time series analysts have developed a host of techniques for dealing
with the adaptation of social and physical systems to environmental
changes. In the intervention analysis pioneered by Box and Tiao (1975),
time series models that allow for a wide variety of adjustment behavior
are developed. In financial economics, critical events such as mergers or
changes in government regulation are routinely studied with time series
regressions and residual diagnostics in so-called "event" studies.
In order to design effective experiments for understanding com-
plicated dynamic phenomena, we believe that a longitudinal design
philosophy may be fruitful. In the labor supply problem, we observeEVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY 149
very substantial individual variation coupled with complicated dynamic
and program duration effects. The "one-shot" experiment may not be
the most effective use of experimental resources. We propose a longitu-
dinal design scheme in which an ongoing panel of households is used as
the population for a large number of smaller-scale experiments. Many
economists would agree that the lack of well-collected panel data on the
household level is a critical problem for economic research. The few
panel data studies available34 have spurred tremendous interest and
basic research in labor economics. It is our view that social investment in
panel data collection on a permanent, ongoing basis has an extremely
high social rate of return.
The existence of a reasonably large panel of households for which
detailed information on most key aspects of household behavior is
available radically reduces the start-up and overhead costs of experi-
ments. It would not be necessary to perform huge screening operations
to identify eligible experimental populations. A long time series of pre-
experimental data would be available for each household so that in-
vestigators would not have to rely on recall. A national sample frame
would be ensured at low cost. Numerous checks and mini-experiments
could be performed to reduce measurement errors or, at least, to
understand the properties of measurement error. It would not be
necessary to train and organize a field interviewing staff from scratch as
was done in the negative income tax experiments. The longitudinal and
ongoing nature of such a project will also force those implementing the
study to design carefully for the coordination between field operations
and analytical database management, an area in which many unan-
ticipated difficulties were experienced in the negative income tax ex-
periments.
Many analysts have noted the tremendous individual variation in
labor supply response. The poor fit of cross-sectional labor supply func-
tions is usually attributed to large, unmeasurable individual taste
effects. In a longitudinal design scheme, households could serve as con-
trols for themselves by alternating experimental and control treatments.
The diagram below indicates a possible design layout for longitudinal
design.
Period
Household 1 2 3 4
1 O O O O
2 X O X X
3 O X X O
4 X X X X
X denotes treatment and O denotes no treatment. In this design, treat-
ments are alternated for some households and remain fixed for other
households. Thus, period 2 serves as a control period for household 2 in150 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
observing response in period 3, in addition to the usual "control"
household number i which is never subjected to treatment. It is possible
to subject different households to different durations of treatment to
study the experimental duration effect. If these observations are spread
over the business cycle, cyclical effects may be eliminated by averaging
experimental response measurements over the business cycle.
As Sherwin Rosen has observed:
We as a profession have engaged in excessive division of labor
with regard to microdata collection. Thinking about survey instru-
ments themselves and how they relate to economic phenomena and
economic theories is probably an area where the social rate of return
is fairly large.3s
The sort of ongoing longitudinal data collection and experimental effort
proposed here would encourage a wide range of research activities and
give economists some private as well as social motivation for worrying
about data collection and social experimentation.
Summary and Conclusions
We discussed some basic considerations involved in the evaluation
of the methodology of social experiments. Many of the points raised
seem obvious but, unfortunately, a number of them did not receive ade-
quate attention in past social experiments in economics, for example in
past negative income tax experiments. In our opinion, in most of these
experiments, inadequate attention was given to formulating clear-cut
attainable objectives. Feasibility studies and "test" or "pilot" experi-
ments were nonexistent or not pursued vigorously enough. Serious
measurement problems were encountered in these experiments and not
dealt with adequately. Subject matter specialists, for example design
statisticians, survey experts and outstanding subject matter theorists,
were underrepresented or absent in the planning and execution of these
experiments. Management and administration procedures were not
completely satisfactory. The objectives of policymakers and of re-
searchers usually were not clearly stated and in agreement. The experi-
mental designs and the models on which they were based were inade-
quate in many cases. Last, the quality of reporting of results was
generally far lower than could have been realized.
Some will say that the personal evaluations presented in the
previous paragraph are "hypercritical" and that the negative income tax
experiments constituted a valuable "learning experience." If so, this
learning experience was very expensive and costly in terms of actual
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with successful social experiments and other uses of scarce research
resources. If learning was a main objective, then it is doubtful that the
design actually used to achieve this objective was a very good one, as
Rosen (1985, p. 137) has stressed.
In the previous sections, we have attempted to provide constructive
suggestions for improving the methodology of social experiments.
Among the points made, these seem particularly important:
1. It is critical to design experiments for successful prediction of
observable outcomes that are central to the objectives of an experiment
and to provide useful measures of predictive accuracy, preferably com-
plete predictive distributions. Sample sizes should be large enough to
yield needed precision in prediction and the range of the design space
should be large enough to attain the objectives of an experiment.
2. When there is uncertainty regarding appropriate models for the
observations, experimental designs that provide information for
discriminating among candidate models should be employed. In this
connection, it has been recognized that many existing designs are very
sensitive to model misspecification, for example errors in choice of func-
tional form, departures from independence, and use of univariate
models when multivariate models are more appropriate.
3. A mixture of model-based and randomized designs seems most
appropriate, with carefully designed randomization procedures em-
ployed to guard against certain types of possible model misspecification
and prejudicial elements. ANOVA-based designs are not adequate
because they are very sensitive to model misspecification, they involve
the need for many experimental units when a large number of
extraneous variables have to be controlled and, most importantly, they
are incapable of generating the predictions required in many social
experiments.
4. Predictive validation of models used in social experiments is
essential. For example, the labor supply equations estimated in the
Seattle experiments can be employed to predict labor supply using data
from the Denver experiment and vice versa. Unsatisfactory predictive
performance is usually an indication of model misspecification, differen-
tial selection and other types of bias, poor data, or other flaws. Further,
vigorous diagnostic checking of models in other ways, for example
residual analyses and outlier detection procedures, is also recommend-
ed. Use of inadequate models vitally affects the internal and external
validity of experiments.
5. Use of point estimates alone to appraise costs of alternative
negative income tax programs, in the very few cases in which cost
estimates were derived, is inadequate. Measures of precision or predic-
tive probability distributions should be provided and interpreted in
easily understandable terms for the benefit of policymakers. For exam-152 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
ple, the probability that the costs of a program lie between $20 billion
and $30 billion, or the probability that the costs exceed $30 billion, can be
calculated and reported. Similar remarks apply to predictions of changes
in hours of work. In both of these instances, it is the case that departures
from independence of outcomes for experimental units can have an ex-
tremely large impact on precision measures, for example standard errors
of total estimated costs and changes in hours. There was little attention
given to these points in past social experiments in spite of the fact that
such dependencies are of great concern in survey work, econometric
analyses of panel data and past work on experimental design.
6. Consideration of dynamic theoretical labor supply models leads to
models for observations that are radically different from the generally
static models employed in most past social experiments, and their use
would lead to different designs for experiments and different models for
analyzing experimental data. It is recognized that the forms of such
dynamic models are often uncertain and thus the use of unrestricted
transfer function models, univariate or multivariate, may be a good
point of departure in design and analysis calculations. Also, as stated
above, design for discriminating among models can be effective in deal-
ing with model uncertainties in dynamic as well as static cases.
7. It is recommended that, when feasible, social experiments be
linked to ongoing longitudinal data generating programs of well-estab-
lished groups, a suggestion put forward years ago by Orcutt and Orcutt
(1968). With such an arrangement, historical variables have been
measured that are useful in before-and-after calculations, as is done in
"event" or "intervention" analyses. A longitudinal design also permits
individuals to be used as their own controls. This is a standard tech-
nique in experimental designs in biology and psychology.36 Longitudi-
nal designs can provide improved results and deserve much further
study. In particular, their use permits exploration of dynamic models
and possible successful extrapolation of experimental results to a
national population, given that the longitudinal sample is a national
one. Of course, administrative costs and other aspects of national, longi-
tudinal experimentation require attention.
While we have pointed to many difficulties involved in past social
experiments, it is our opinion that properly conducted social experiments
can yield enormous social benefits. Perhaps the objectives of past experi-
ments have been too broad and ambitious, a point also made by
Griliches (1985). Limiting objectives of social experiments in economics
may be essential for attaining success. Successful experience with exper-
imentation in the areas of experimental economics, quality manage-
ment, marketing, and agricultural economics tends to support this view.
Also, "on-line" experimentation to appraise proposed changes in exist-
ing social programs probably will be fertile ground for social experi-EVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY 153
menters who draw on the growing quality-management literature on
this topic.
Finally, we have noted that the negative income tax experiments
were focused on variants of the negative income tax proposal put for-
ward many years ago by Friedman (1962), T¢~bin et al. (1967) and others.
Unfortunately, the information provided by these experiments was not
generally considered in relation to possible fundamental modifications
of the original proposals. Among possible modifications, one might be
the use of time paths for tax payments different from those used in the
negative income tax experiments. To subject a poor person who begins
to work to a marginal tax rate of 50 to 70 percent immediately is an
extreme "treatment." It seems feasible to formulate a more sensible
temporal pattern of tax payments that would avoid these high, initial
marginal rates, a topic for future research and, perhaps, additional social
experimentation.
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IWith respect to the New Jersey negative income tax experiment, Rossi and Lyall
(1976) conclude, "When it came down to the congressional debate on FAP, it was evident
that while the labor supply question interested some congressmen in a general way, con-
cerns were addressed more to the total costs of a national program, an issue to which the
experiment could not offer an answer even when complete. It is one of the apparent
ironies of the experiment that while its motivation sprang from a strong concern with
poverty and a desire on the part of both the experimenters and OEO to effect national
welfare reform, its most substantial contributions may well be of a more scholarly sort in
the area of experimental design and work behavioral response." (pp.176-77.)
2Rossi and Lyall (1976) remark with respect to the New Jersey experiment,
"Economists played dominant roles in all phases of the experiment . . . Sociologists and
social psychologists were to play minor roles in both the design and analysis. Not only are
the strengths of economists reflected in the experiment, but also some of the mistakes and
omissions of the experiment show the mark of the dominant economists." (pp. 10-11.)
3See Friedman (1962, p. 193) and Tobin, Pechman and Mieszkowski (1967) for calcula-
tions of the costs of existing welfare programs and of negative income tax programs.
4Spiegelman and Yaeger (1980, pp. 474-476) provide a useful discussion of reporting
error in the Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiments. On the basis of a "large
sample wage income study," they report that, "SIME/DIME participants reported be-
tween $100 and $300 less per year to the experiment than to the Internal Revenue Service.
This amount is less than 5 percent of mean income. The variance in the amount under-
reported to SIME/DIME is on the order of $1,000, or about one-fifth of mean income. We
observed that almost as many people overreported their incomes as underreported them."
To understand these and other measurement problems, they state that "Further study of
individual cases is necessary." These conclusions relate to wage income, which is prob-
ably easier to measure than non-wage income. Ferber and Hirsch (1982) present much
useful material on measurement problems in the negative income tax experiments.
5It is surprising to us that M. Friedman (1986) and J. Tobin (1986), two leading experts
on negative income tax proposals, did not play major roles in the experiments. Tobin (un-
dated) did provide some comments on the design of the New Jersey experiment. He
wrote, "I find an "anova" specification implausible for this problem. But I recognize that154 Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi
there is a certain arbitrariness to any particular parametric specification." (p. 18)
6When single equation regression or response surface models were employed for
design purposes, possible dependence of observations was rarely, if ever, considered.
7See McFadden (1985) and Ferber and Hirsch (1982) for valuable considerations of this
range of issues.
8For example, observation of the population at various stages of the business cycle is
relevant for negative income tax experiments. Seasonality is also relevant.
9See Hausman and Wise (1979, 1985, p. 208) and Robins and West (1986) for analyses
of attrition bias and efforts to deal with it. Robins and West (1986) conclude on the basis of
their analysis of Seattle-Denver data that "Our results suggest that standard procedures of
correcting for attrition bias do not always yield the proper results. The use of these pro-
cedures, however, depends to a large extent on the ability to model the attrition process
and on the degree of attrition in the sample. In the SIME/DIME sample in which attrition
was fairly modest.., such techniques simply do not have the power to identify precisely
the biases." (p. 337) In spite of these reservations, the authors conclude that "attrition bias
is not a serious enough problem in the SIME/DIME data to warrant extensive correction
procedures." A similar conclusion was reached by Hausman and Wise (1979) in their
analysis of the Gary income maintenance experiment. (p. 937). Ferber and Hirsch (1982,
p. 75 and p. 95) have reservations about such conclusions, however.
10See the appendix to Hamilton et al. (1969) for a discussion of the importance of good
management in large scale research projects.
11Rossi and Lyall (1976) give the following breakdown of total costs of the New Jersey
negative income tax experiment.
A. Administration and Research
Mathematica $4,426,858
IRP-U. of Wisconsin 812,648
sub total $5,239,506
B. Transfer Payments 2,375,189
C. Grand Total $7,614,695
They state, "The expenditures were a considerable overrun on the initial estimates of
approximately $3 million. Most of the unanticipated expenses occurred on the research
side. The handling of large and complicated data sets was simply much more costly than
anyone anticipated." (p. 11) These comments underline the importance of good manage-
ment techniques in the planning and execution of social experiments. For further discus-
sion of these issues, see Ferber and Hirsch (1982).
~2See footnote 1 for a possible illustration of this point in connection with the N. J.
experiment.
13See Hausman and Wise (1985) for an exellent collection of articles on key aspects of
analysis of economic experiments and Aigner and Morris (1979) for extensive discussion of
designs of these experiments.
~4See Watts and Bawden (1978) for discussion. Of course, some social experiments
such as the Housing Supply Experiment are not feasible without a site approach. It would
be impossible to discern a supply effect without involving a large percentage of
households in particular housing markets.
~SSee Keeley et al. (1978a) for an example of this sort of calculation for a national
negative income tax. Labor supply response functions were coupled with census
household data in a "micro-simulation" of the national program.
16The experiences with changes in the New Jersey welfare laws during the course of
the experiment highlight the importance of diversification. State-to-state differences in
program implementation are to be expected in a national implementation of a negative
income tax program. An experiment based on only one or two states cannot possibly take
into account variation in local welfare programs.
~TConlisk and Watts (1979), p. 40.
18See Morris (1979) for a discussion of the finite selection model which essentially pro-
vides a randomization technique for providing more balanced experimental designs. The
finite selection model utilizes the same sort of objective function and cost constraint as the
Conlisk/Watts model.
19Hausman and Wise (1985) and Keeley et al. (1980) point out that current designs do
not ensure that statistically significant treatment effects can be obtained.
20Keeley et al. (1978, p. 11).
21It was not until 1978 that Keeley et al. produced a thorough analysis of costs of aEVALUATING THE METHODOLOGY 155
national negative income tax based on labor supply response estimates from experimental
data.
22See Keeley et al. (1978b, Table 3, p. 13) for estimates.
23The fitted model is a truncated normal regression or tobit model. The interpretation
of o as the standard deviation of prediction error conditional on knowing the model
parameters is strictly not correct, o should be interpreted as the standard deviation of
prediction error for the latent variable. At levels of the independent variables for which
little truncation occurs it is approximately correct to view o as the root mean squared error
of prediction.
24See Stafford (1985) for discussion of these studies and a table of elasticity estimates.
2SDiffuse priors may be used in studies with little or unreliable nonexperimental data.
26See Hausman and Wise (1979a,b), Heckman (1978) and Hausman and Wise (1985)
for discussion of modeling approaches to these problems.
27See Rossi (1985) for details of these calculations and an application to choice between
alternative functional forms.
28Heckman (1976) makes this point.
29See Duan et al. (1984). This model has been employed earlier in econometrics by
Orcutt, Goldberger and many others.
30See Zellner and Rossi (1984) for an example of this approach for binomial response
models and Zellner (1971, 1984).
31Griliches (1985), p. 138.
32The Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiment contained treatments of three,
five and 20 years. It is very difficult to find discussion of the results for 20-year treatments.
33Within the context of linear models, these dynamic specifications yield restricted
transfer function models.
34The survey and income dynamics survey conducted at University of Michigan and
the national longitudinal labor survey are examples.
3SRosen (1985, p. 137).
36Rossi and Lyall (1976), p. 42, fn. 24. See also Campbell and Stanley (1963), and Hall
(1975).
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Jerry A. Hausman *
After a brief introduction Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi turn to
relevant considerations for evaluation of social experiment method-
ology. They discuss eight considerations which encompass design,
management, and analysis of social experiments. In general their list
provides a good common sense approach to the subject. I would like to
stress their seventh point: that experiments should be designed to pro-
vide "accurate enough" predictions of various proposed policies along
with measures of predictive precision. Because of the large amount of
inherent variability in responses to tax and welfare policies, even within
the assumption of a correctly specified model to evaluate the responses,
two aspects of the Zellner-Rossi prescription should be emphasized.
First, the range of policies that the experimental results will be used to
evaluate must be specified with sufficient precision so that the experi-
ment covers them. Otherwise, extrapolation outside the range of the ex-
periment will be required, with undesirable consequences. This goal is
often very difficult to achieve without increasing the costs greatly, and
this aspect of design is especially dependent on the "specialists" Zellner
and Rossi refer to. Second, the design and results must be able to supply
results that are sufficiently precise to use. My greatest disappointment
with the negative income tax experiments has been the low level of
precision that arose from the results. Future social experiments should
make sufficient precision in outcomes among their highest priorities in
design.
Zellner and Rossi turn next to design considerations within a static
framework. They criticize the Conlisk-Watts design for the negative
income tax experiments for too restricted variation in experimental treat-
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ment. Since I have discussed the Conlisk-Watts design elsewhere
(Hausman 1982 and Hausman and Wise 1985), I will not return to
previous ground. However, I would like to point out that the Zellner-
Rossi criticism holds only within the context of a structural model of
labor supply, for example the famous Elfving result for linear models,
which places all the observations at the extreme points of the design
space. In an ANOVA framework the response to each treatment point is
estimated separately, so the Zellner-Rossi criticism does not apply. Even
within the context of a structural model, I have considerable doubt
whether I would want to use the responses. Our structural models are
not usually sufficiently well specified that they can do a good job on
extreme points in the sample space.
Next in their discussion of the Conlisk-Watts approach, Zellner and
Rossi emphasize the specification of a demand equation for allocations
of subjects across treatment groups. However, they fail to take into
account the complexity of the actual demand equations that arise in
response to government programs. For instance, the labor supply equa-
tion (leisure demand equation) will not be continuous even in the tax
rates because of the nonconvexities in the budget sets. (See Burtless and
Hausman 1978 and Hausman 1985.) The "housing gap" treatment in
the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment has similar characteristics.
This very complicated response surface is quite different from the
response surfaces in many physical situations, where the responses are
apt to be smooth. Zellner and Rossi should consider in more detail the
complications for experimental design which these types of demand
functions imply. These complications should induce a more favorable
attitude to randomization procedures, which Zellner and Rossi discuss
but do not strongly advocate.
Zellner and Rossi emphasize that a decision-theoretic approach
would more likely lead to results that are usable by policymakers. While
they stress a Bayesian approach to the problem of reporting results, I
have found that an analogous "classical" approach, with point
estimates and standard errors that account for parameter uncertainty,
are straightforward to compute and seemingly well understood by
public utility commission staffs who have evaluated results from experi~
ments. I am in total agreement with Zellner and Rossi that the results of
an experiment should be sufficiently precise to yield predictions with
enough precision to give good guidance to policy. As Zellner and Rossi
demonstrate in their analysis of the Keeley et al. results (1978) from the
Seattle-Denver experiments, the negative income tax experimental
designs do not lead to precise predictions about the labor supply
response, which was certainly one of the major goals of the experi-
ments. (Note that the Zellner-Rossi estimates of the prediction error of
the Keeley results would be considerably larger if parameter uncertainty160 Jerry A. Hausman
were accounted for, since this uncertainty is correlated across all obser-
vations in a microsimulation.)
Zellner and Rossi then turn to dynamic aspects of social experi-
ments. They emphasize correctly that the experiments typically are of
short duration, while the policies are permanent in nature and may
therefore call forth a different response. However, I disagree with their
suggestion that a Box-Jenkins times series approach would be a useful
starting point for analysis. Lagged endogenous variables are quite diffi-
cult~ to treat in short panels because of initial condition problems; more
importantly, the errors of measurement, which Zellner and Rossi
emphasize earlier in their paper, have potentially devastating effects on
times series type models of panel data. (See Griliches and Hausman
1986.) I do agree with their suggestions on the usefulness of panel data,
which I discuss with respect to social experiments in Hausman (1982).
However, it must be noted that panel data may raise the costs con-
siderably for an experiment because of the necessity of keeping track of
panel members. The cost trade-off between panel data and cross-section
data would need to be considered, as Heckman has emphasized in
recent research.
Zellner and Rossi conclude that the goal, design, execution, and
analysis of the negative income tax experiments left much to be desired.
I agree with these conclusions in large part. However, I believe their fail-
ings can be partly explained by the design and execution of the Gary and
Seattle-Denver experiments before the lessons of the New Jersey experi-
ment were learned. Presumably better experiments would be conducted
now. My major point of disagreement lies in the analysis of the data: I
believe that Zellner and Rossi have too much faith in structural models
and that their time series approach to longitudinal data would not work
well. But, we certainly agree that such experiments should be designed
so as to be able to answer the important questions at issue in a precise
enough manner to be useful for planning and policy purposes.DISCUSSION 161
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Charles E. Metcalf*
Arnold Zellner and Peter E. Rossi review the conventional criticisms
of the methodology of the early income maintenance experi-
ments-which by now have had 19 years to accumulate--and provide
their own suggestions for design of social experiments. Unfortunately,
the authors’ own recommendations fare poorly against the standards of
criticism applied to previous work, and show insufficient evidence of
the 19 years of experience that have accumulated since the design work
for the first negative income tax experiment began. My comments follow
the approximate sequence of the paper.
Considerations for Evaluating Methodology
In the first part of their paper, Zellner and Rossi offer eight con-
siderations for evaluating the methodology of a social experiment. These
conventional observations are largely correct but naively elaborated
upon. For example, the call for "interaction between sponsors and bid-
ders in the preparation of proposals" reflects a simplistic view of the
competitive procurement process, but does touch on an important issue:
the complex relations among contractor selection, project design, and
project execution. Indeed, it is increasingly common for the design and
execution phases of an experiment or evaluation to be the subjects of
separate contract procurements.
Concerning the desirability of conducting a "pilot" trial of an
experiment before proceeding with the "final" experiment, the distinco
*President, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. Views expressed are the sole respon-
sibility of the author.DISCUSSION 163
tion between these concepts is blurred in an evaluation environment
cluttered with an extensive history of social experiments and demonstra-
tions. We must also keep in mind that each "desirable" characteristic of
an experiment has an opportunity cost, not the least of which is the
passage of time. (Most suggestions for improving methodology tend to
increase the duration of an experiment.) While many people--myself
included--view the social experiments as having made important con-
tributions to the policy process, provision of timely input with respect to
originally specified experimental objectives is rarely one of them.
Failure to acknowledge opportunity costs also causes the authors to
overstate another observation, which carries forward to their critique of
the negative income tax experiments: "If the objectives . . . involve
generalization.., to an entire population, then the sample.., has to be a
sample from the relevant population." (Emphasis added.) It is equally
true, however, that the program intervention being tested has to be the
"relevant" intervention--in terms of features of program administra-
tion, duration, and so forth--and these two objectives are frequently in
conflict. An experimental design stressing intervention with the right
population is not clearly preferable to an experiment that restricts the
population to improve the intervention.
Static Design Issues
Several static design issues raised by Zellner and Rossi are worthy of
comment. First, the claim that the planners of the negative income tax
experiments exaggerated the problems with administration and field
operations of a national experiment is probably true for data collection,
but not, in my judgment, for program administration. Recall that an
effective implementation of a program intervention requires--aside from
its placement in an effective evaluation structure--creation of a "rele-
vant" program environment as viewed by the experimental subject; real
and perceived independence of program administration from data col-
lection; and at least some participation of welfare agencies in all jurisdic-
tions covered by the experiment. These pressures all work to limit the
number of jurisdictions covered by an experiment, and are further
enhanced by the increasing prevalence of the view that "relevant" pro-
gram interventions must be implemented by "real" program agencies
rather than by experimenters, in order to be credible. This evolution is
paralleled by a clear transition from experiments that test parameters to
randomized demonstrations that test program interventions. There has
been a recent trend toward the use of representative samples for
demonstrations and/or experiments, but with cluster samples utilizing
"real" program interventions in a relatively few sites.164 Charles E. Metcalf
Second, the authors criticize the negative income tax experiments
for being too conservative in their choice of design parameters for the ex-
periments. From a pure design perspective most experimenters would
agree with the authors. But policymakers with whom the experimenters
had to interact were reluctant to consider the concept of "extreme" ex-
perimental treatments outside the "policy-relevant range."
Third, the authors provide an extensive discussion contrasting the
"response surface" and ANOVA approaches to design, and stressing
importance of the analytic models that drive the experimental design. I
agree with much of the authors’ position here, and my disagreements
with them are more often of form than of substance. Several points,
however, are worth raising:
The response surface approach is described as producing "non-
randomized" designs. This is true of the finite selection model
extreme, but not of the Conlisk/Watts approach, which deter-
mines probabilities of selection for each element in the design
space. So long as no probabilities of selection are permitted to go
to zero, there exists an ANOVA equivalent for each response sur-
face design.
The potential damage caused by use of an inappropriate design
model depends upon whether its use eliminates design points
called for by the "correct" model, or whether it merely reduces
estimation efficiency for the correct model. A linear or Cobb-
Douglas model would spell disaster for the estimation of a
translog function, but the converse is not so.
In the (universal?) case where the correct model is not known with
certainty, a risk-averse design strategy involves use of a model
with more "dimensions" than specific models likely to be
investigated, preferably with all probabilities of selection con-
strained to be positive. Inclusion of an ANOVA model as one of
several weighted alternatives fulfills this objective. In such an en-
vironment it would not be surprising for the full design model
never to be used for analysis.
Fourth, I do not regard the role of controls in social experiments as
being "unusual" in their use of the status quo rather than the classical
"no treatment" as the basis of comparison. The control group should
reflect a relevant counterfactual, which may or may not meet the seman-
tic definition of "no treatment." Consider also that removal from
previously existing treatment is "no treatment" in only the most
unrealistic of static worlds. As for whether controls are necessary except
as cheap observations, this depends upon the experimental objective.
For most policy purposes, as well as most reasonable predictive pro-
cedures, the relevant counterfactual is a critical component of evalua-DISCUSSION 165
tion. Indeed, I would regard the proper objective of the negative income
tax experiments not to be estimation of the national cost of a negative
income tax for comparison with external cost data for AFDC; rather,
they should be providing internally valid direct estimates of the differential
cost. I would argue this point on both policy and statistical grounds.
Fifth, I do not regard the discussion of cross-unit dependence as
being particularly relevant from an empirical perspective, since rho = .01
is massive when applied for each unit to each of 40,000,000 other units,
not "small" as alleged by the authors. If I were looking for a reason to
disregard nominal standard errors obtained from the experiments, I
would make a simple appeal to cluster sampling theory. For similar
reasons I would not use labor supply functions fitted to Denver data to
predict response for the Seattle sample, as suggested by the authors for
validation, since the relevant sample size is two in too many dimensions.
Rather, I would recommend a traditional split sample approach cutting
across site boundaries to achieve that objective.
Dynamic Design Issues
The authors’ discussion of dynamic design issues goes rather
smoothly until they take seriously the notion of a longitudinal panel as
the basis for drawing experimental samples, which takes the flawed con-
cept of letting individuals be their own controls to an unfortunate
extreme.
Concerning their general discussion, I would be careful to distin-
guish between two important but separate issues: the use of limited-
duration interventions in place of relevant longer-term interventions (for
example, the negative income tax experiments) and limited-duration
observation of longer-term dynamic consequences. Time series models,
for example, deal with the latter but not the former problem.
I have no quarrel with advocacy of better longitudinal data sources
for continuing evaluation and research, often as an alternative to ran-
domized experiments. The development of the SIPP panel appears to be
especially promising. On the other hand, evidence is mounting that
efforts to use longitudinal panels as comparison group alternatives to
randomized control groups have been unsuccessful.
Similarly, the theoretical concept of an experimental panel has merit
so long as it can provide an adequate sample, so long as the relevant
program interventions can be applied to it, and so long as the sample
points are disposable rather than reusable. Sample adequacy is a major
problem, since many program interventions of policy interest are
targeted to relatively small segments of the population. Earlier in my
comments I questioned the ability to create the relevant program en-166 Charles E. Metcalf
vironment with a dispersed sample for most social programs of the sort
earmarked for experiments or demonstrations.
Finally, the concept of reusing sample points in repeated ex-
periments sounds fine when all interventions and impacts are static, but
in a world of dynamic interventions and impacts the cross-experimental
contamination effects would appear to destroy all credibility of the
experimental results. Continuing panels for data collection are fine; for
controlled interventions, extremely questionable.